Every philosophy essay is a delicate word-limit balance between clarity and precision. In this case I sacrificed the latter for the sake of the former. Perhaps I should have done the opposite but then again that would have robbed me of an awesome commenter.

In the case of Endurantism it’s tempting to think that this requires a Presentist view (otherwise an Enduring thing would instantiate incompatible properties at different times and violate non-contradiction). However this difficulty can be sidestepped by option for a time-indexed or time-mediated property instantiation. So Endurantism, while perhaps fitting more intuitively with Presentism in no way _requires_ it.

Similarly for Perdurantism, the fact that the view makes use of a single object (a spacetime worm) existing at different times might lead one to think this requires Eternalism since those ‘other times’ had better be ‘real’ if the temporally-extended object exists at them. But this too can be circumvented by supposing (e.g.) that the spacetime worm only exists ‘now’ and at other times merely subsists. This view is perhaps even less intuitive than the Endurantist case, but it’s not incoherent.