Main site     Other writings     Forum     Drawings gallery


My Two Cents’

In actuality it was two pence. And a couple of pounds.

Let me explain.

Loose change is a constant curse in this country. My trousers are sagging around my ankles with the weight of copper in my pockets – baring my arse for the world to see. Yes, I am that rich. Why would I ever need to buy anything with 1p coins? The Queen must have some sinister ulterior motives for turning us all into walking and talking lightning rods. Making use of the resulting conductivity for evil mind-control rays or some su – God Save the Queen!

Ah, where was I? Oh, yes. Loose change. As horrifically annoying it is to have too much of the bleeding stuff, you never even have the right stuff. When I do laundry the washers will only accept 1-pound coins. Three of the buggers per wash. Yes, three. I usually fill up two machines at a time. There is no need to waste any more time doing laundry than you absolutely have to, now is there? Except for the fact that you never, ever have 6 bloody 1-pound coins in your wallet by sheer accident.

No, big deal. I’ll just go down to the store and have them exchange my people-money into the native currency of the Laundrian Republic, won’t I? No, sir. That won’t do! What were you thinking, sir? Tricks may be for kids but convenience sure as Hell isn’t for Brits. Boldly I blasted open the store-doors just before closing time! Armed with a single 1-pound coin, an additional 2-pound coin, and a 5-pound note I prowled in on my prey; the lady at the register. With weary eyes she acknowledged my presence, ‘yes?’

‘Yes, hello,’ I said with thick Scandinavian accent that probably makes people think I’m thick. ‘Could you exchange these,’ I held up the 2-pound coin and the 5-pound note ‘for 1-pound coins.’ Panicked at the sight of a crazy Scandinavian with an apparent loose change fetish she started to glance to her sides for backup.

Uh, I’m afraid I can’t do that,’ she said. ‘I can only give you two pounds.’

‘Yes, fine,’ I said in the bitter knowledge that I would need 3 more pounds to satiate the Angry Sock-Eater. But, aha! In my mind I hatched an ingenious scheme. Nervously I reached for the coins she was handing me back. Could she tell that my intentions were less than pure? Had she noticed? Would she have looked more sophisticated with a beard? No, she wasn’t on to me. I successfully obtained the two washer-snacks. Success! And now for the tricky part.

‘How much is this disgusting Lilt pineapple & grapefruit soda?’

‘Uh, 99p,’ she responded with bewilderment on her face.

‘Great! I’ll have two.’ With an evil grin I reintroduced her to my neglected friend Mr. 5-pounder.

Puddles, Black Holes & Fungi

Explain the ‘fine-tuning’ version of the teleological argument. Then argue for whether or not it supports the rationality of theism.

I shall argue that, while it might support the rationality of believing there is an explanation, the fine-tuning version of the teleological argument does not support the rationality of granting any particular explanation – e.g. theism – precedence.

Teleological arguments hinge upon certain attributes of natural phenomena being evidential of intentional purposiveness. Very crudely put; just as a painting must have a painter, so must the creation have a creator. Of course there is far between this simplistic reasoning and its more sophisticated kinship; most importantly, the replacement of question begging with a rationale for why said attributes are indicative of design.

One such common rationale is the improbability of an attribute emerging by blind chance as opposed to the greater likelihood of its emergence by conscious agency. This is the driving force of the fine-tuning version. The improbable attribute to be explained is the structured order of the universal laws. Particularly the emphasis is on their apparent finely tuned suitability to intelligent life.

When faced with this imposing list [of such “happy cosmic accidents.”], it’s shocking to find how many of the familiar constants of the universe lie within a very narrow band that makes life possible (Kaku, 2006, p. 247).

.

An existing universal lawmaker, who desired intelligent life, would be a perfectly reasonable explanation for why the laws allow it. Nonetheless, while certainly true, this immediately raises the question of why we should grant intelligent life the privilege of being such an end-goal. A much-used defence against the strong anthropic principle – stating that the universe had to permit the emergence of observers (Le Poidevin, 1996, p. 59) – is simply to turn it into a weak one. Perhaps most famously expressed by Douglas Adams:

[it] is rather as if you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, ‘This is an interesting world I find myself in – an interesting hole I find myself in – fits me rather neatly, doesn’t it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it! (Digital Biota 2, 1998)’

However, Adams’ quip contains more than the superficial banality of a mere weak anthropic ‘wherever you go, there you are!’ If the hole is analogous to the universe and its shape represents one possible permutation of its laws, then Adams is entertaining the notion of observer-emergence independent of any particular permutation – i.e. a puddle would form snugly in any hole. Granted, such speculation of alternative biochemistry – e.g. non-carbon based life – is unverifiable science fiction. However, while the atheist cannot claim hypothetical alternative life-permitting universes, neither can the theist claim its negation. Though the recent discovery of fungi living on gamma radiation (Calvo, 2002) leaves something to be said for the potentiality of unlimited strangeness in life, it is fair to say that the latter assumption might not be as speculative as the former. Then again, the former is not being used as a premise for an even more speculative conclusion.

By no means is the argument unsalvageable, however, since it is unclear why it should require the strong anthropic principle. After all, the improbable attribute under consideration is the ordered structure of the laws – not their alleged purpose. It is easily imaginable then that conscious observers are just a by-product of God’s true purpose for creation. Presumably if God desired a universe containing black holes then it would have to include matter dense enough to allow gravitational singularities and carbon-based life alike. It is perhaps not as intuitively comforting as to believe all to be for one’s own benefit. But who would presume certainty that a supreme being does not fancy black holes over humans?

Could we then explain the improbability of our universal laws by altering our newly formulated strong black hole principle into a weaker version as with its anthropic counterpart? It seems unlikely without invoking modal realism or fecund universes theory. Accepting the actual existence of many worlds in order to escape the existence of God seems arbitrarily discriminatory (unless you are a quantum physicist and therefore believe that there is bona fide evidence for a multiverse). However – as with our previous considerations of alternative biochemistry – it is not necessary to grant any veracity to these speculations. Their mere conceivability still acts as a wedge between the premises of the fine-tuning argument and its conclusion.

The theist could still insist on an inference to the best explanation. Yet it remains to be seen why God’s agency is any better an explanation than the rest. The accuracy of such an inference depends on our knowledge of (i) preferably all – or at the very least most – of the possible explanations and (ii) the conditional framework in which they are competing to assess them against. We do not know (i) because it could be almost any imaginable or unimaginable thing. Neither do we know (ii) because we are attempting to explain the origin of the very framework with which we normally assess such matters.

One could say that the best explanation is the most probable one. However – as Le Poidevin argues in Arguing for Atheism (1996, pp. 49-54) – this is amenable to exactly the same critique:

[…] if the probability of events is determined in part by the laws of physics, what can it mean to talk of the probability of the laws of physics themselves? (loc. cit.)

.

After being stripped of the persuasive lure of appeals to design or probability, the fine-tuning argument is left to fend only with measly demands of ‘…but surely the universe did not originate arbitrarily? Why precisely these laws?’ These are perfectly valid concerns and few people think the universe ‘just happened.’ But atheism does not commit to that. It is disingenuous to present the issue as if one must either accept arbitrariness or God.

It is true that if God exists then the likelihood of a human existence is greater than not. However, as we have explored the same is true for any number of speculative explanations – with the added worry of those we have yet to think of. Inasmuch as the fine-tuning argument supports the rationality of any belief, it can only support that there is an explanation. To go from there to the assertion of God as the explanation to the exclusion of other possibilities is a textbook example of a fallacious ‘God of the gaps’ argument.

I find it hard to believe that anybody would ever use the anthropic principle if he had a better explanation for something. I’ve yet, for example, to hear an anthropic principle of world history (Guth, Alan, cf. Lightman, 1990, p. 479).

.

Bibliography

Books:

Kaku, Michio, Parallel Worlds: The science of alternative universes and our future in the cosmos, (Penguin Books: London, GB, 2006)

Le Poidevin, Robin, Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (Routledge: New York, US, 1996)

Lightman, Alan, and Roberta Brawer, Origins: The Lives and Worlds of Modern
Cosmologists
, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1990)

Journals:

Calvo, Ana M. Et al. “Relationship between secondary metabolism and fungal development”, Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews (September 2002) p. 447-459, Vol. 66, No. 3

Web Pages:

Adams, Douglas, “Is there an Artificial God?” (speech), Digital Biota 2 (September 1998), URL = < http://www.biota.org/people/douglasadams/>.

Ratzsch, Del, “Teleological Arguments for God’s Existence”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/teleological-arguments/>.

Lecture slides:

Lecture 7: Analyzing Teleological Arguments.

Some old songs of mine

A few days ago some stranger contacted me on facebook and said she remembers having heard some of my songs a long time ago. She requested that I make them available yet again. Wow, I had no idea anyone actually remembers these. Let alone that anyone should want to hear them again.

They are very old and I think they are horrendous. However, if anyone wants them, here they are. Don’t say I didn’t warn you. The beats to all of these are made by DJ Equinox, except for Sword Swingin’. I have absolutely no idea where that beat came from.

Sketch Sepahi – Valsendings Kjaftarí

Go get Adobe Flash Player!

Sketch Sepahi – Say Shit

Go get Adobe Flash Player!

DJ Equinox & Sketch Sepahi – Nightmare

Go get Adobe Flash Player!

Sketch Sepahi – Paranoid

Go get Adobe Flash Player!

Blacircus, Sketch Sepahi & Prinz Logan – Sword Swingin’

Go get Adobe Flash Player!

Ineffable Face of God

Explain either the temporal or modal version of the cosmological argument.  Then argue for whether it is or is not a sound argument for the existence of God.

Intention

In this essay I shall argue that the modal version of the cosmological argument for the existence of God is either not sound or not a problem for atheism.

Briefly on the Concept of ‘God’

For the purpose of this essay I assume that by ‘God’ we mean a sentient entity in possession of all the classical omni- characteristics. However, it should be noted that any sentient force, which could be said to have brought about the world, as we know it, would do. Admittedly, as religious commentator, Alan Watts, says in one of his lectures ‘sophisticated Christians [...] think beyond images’ and ‘[do] not imagine that God is a cosmic male parent with a white beard sitting on a golden throne above the stars (Watts, 1996, p. 74).’ Suffice it to say that if by ‘God’ we do not even refer to a personal creator but something more ineffable still, then I take no issue with that other than on a trivially semantic level, and my critique ceases to apply. However, it also ceases to be a problem, since such sophistry is atheism in anything but name.

The Modal Cosmological Argument

I shall base my analysis loosely on the modal cosmological argument as it is presented in Arguing for Atheism (Le Poidevin, 1996, pp. 8-9). With that in mind I shall take some liberties of my own. These are intended as an attempt at strengthening the argument against my own critique and will hopefully not misconstrue it.

Arguably the question at the heart of cosmological arguments is ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ Modal logic is the study of expressions pertaining to necessity and possibility (Garson, 2009). That we are able to ask the question seems to imply that it is conceivably possible that nothing would have existed at all. Therefore, the fact that there are existing things, which do not necessitate their own existence, leads to the conclusion that their existence requires an independent, necessarily existing explanation. In my own words:

1.    Everything, which could have failed to exist, requires an explanation for why it does.
2.    Only necessarily existing things are self-explanatory.
3.    Therefore, there must be a necessary ultimate explanation for every contingently existing thing.
4.    (An inclusion I would rather avoid for reasons I shall make clear) ‘The universe’ is such a contingently existing thing.

Why the Concept of Causality is Irrelevant

In Le Poidevin’s rendition of the argument the word ‘cause’ is consistently used. I should like to abandon it in favour of ‘explanation,’ since the former is unnecessarily problematic. ‘Cause’ implies a temporally preceding chain of events. There is no reason to assume that creation from God’s perspective should be temporally situated at the farthest preceding event from ours. That is not to say God must have an entirely atemporal existence, as this too would be unnecessarily problematic. God just need not be located at the beginning of our timeline. Consider this by analogy of computer-simulations. It is entirely possible to program a computer to count numbers but start it off at say 354. From the programmer’s perspective the simulation began at some time – or perhaps multiple times in the case of repeated runs – on our timeline and began at 354 in the simulated timeline. However, for a hypothetical person living in the simulation it all started at zero. Or perhaps it stretches infinitely back into the negative integers.

The Universe

I have also sought to avoid mentioning the concept of ‘the universe.’ The word seems to be taken for granted. However, my intuitive understanding of it would wreak havoc on the cosmological argument. To me it just means something akin to ‘the set of everything there is.’ In this sense it would simply be ludicrous to insist that the existence of the universe requires an explanation, as ‘the universe’ is not an existing entity in itself but simply a word used to collectively denote all existing entities. Moreover, it would make no sense to speak of something existing outside of all there is. Clearly I must give the theist the benefit of the doubt and conclude that she means something radically different from what I do.

As with the word ‘cause’ I should like to replace it with something less problematic – but what? I must admit being at a complete loss. Supposedly we could replace it by ‘everything physical.’ However, this raises equally problematic questions as to what ‘physical’ means, and whether the fact that every particular physical entity is contingent – if granted – can be extended to physicality in general. Also it seems to beg the question to a physicalist, to whom the very idea of non-physical existence requires prior justification. Not to mention that it would invite a problem reminiscent of dualism’s mind-body problem (Robinson, 2008), in that it is unclear how something non-physical could explain physical existence.

A Face on the Ineffable

We could simply revert back to the initial question of why anything would exist at all. However, this would do the theist no favours since the modal cosmological argument is precisely an attempt to render this very question meaningless. If the ultimate explanation of all other existence itself exists necessarily, then there could not possibly have been nothing. The contingency of existence would therefore have to be localised and not applicable to all existence. Are we then speaking of different categories of existence? If so, how do we distinguish them?

The theist could still insist that the universe is contingent. I should then be very interested in learning what this intriguing word entails. However, I would posit that it poses no problem for the atheist. Atheism does not require one to deny the existence of everything other than the universe – regardless of what is meant by ‘universe.’

Conclusion

If the theist can appeal to the necessity of existence, then so can the atheist. Inasmuch as this is all the argument shows the atheist can simply refuse to acknowledge a personification of the ultimate explanation. It might be a sound argument albeit not one for the existence of ‘God’ as previously defined.

The theist would be required to justify that ‘God’ understood specifically as a sentient creator is, in fact, necessary. However, if such an ontological argument were to be achieved successfully, there should be no need for cosmological arguments.

[I]f by ‘God,’ one means the set of physical laws that govern the universe, then clearly there is such a God. This God is emotionally unsatisfying… it does not make much sense to pray to the law of gravity (Sagan, Carl).

Bibliography

End-quote:

The quote is widely attributed to Carl Sagan and cited in numerous books, yet oddly enough never with the inclusion of a proper reference. As such I have included it by virtue of its own merits regardless of its dubious authenticity. A possible origin of the quote can be found in:

Sagan, Carl, Broca’s Brain: Reflections on the Romance of Science (Ballantine Books, 1993, CA, p. 330)

Books:

Le Poidevin, Robin, Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Routledge: New York, US, 1996)

Watts, Alan, Myth and Religion: The Edited Transcripts (Tuttle Publishing, US, 1996)

Web Pages:

Garson, James, “Modal Logic”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/logic-modal/>.

Robinson, Howard, “Dualism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/dualism/>.

Liberty and Sex on the Sidewalk

Mill said that “… the sole end for which mankind are warranted … in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection”. Do you agree?


Image blatently stolen from booksshouldbefree.com

Image blatently stolen from booksshouldbefree.com


In this essay I shall argue in agreement with Mill but propose a modified liberalism in response to prevailing critiques.

Mill contends that every individual is entitled to liberty to the point where it infringes upon that of others.

It is worth noting that the use of ‘self-protection’ might be misleading. Suffice it to say that Mill is not merely referring to the self-protection of oneself but to the self-protection of mankind in general. Therefore, it is not the case that Mill’s liberalism requires one to stand passive observer to a perpetrator’s infliction of harm upon others. In the very next passage Mill goes on to say:

That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others (Mill, 1865, p. 6).

What constitutes harm to others? We all agree that some acts are indubitably harmful and others not – yet it is difficult to draw the precise line between the two.

Should offensiveness be considered harmful to others? Mill argues no (ibid., p. 31) because any argument, which holds any weight, is offensive to those whose opinion it is directed at. It is therefore prudent to make a distinction between distress and harm. It can be argued that offence necessarily entails distress. Yet if we are to remain consistent, distress alone cannot count as harm.

What then of inconvenience? Can an act, which will consequently cause other people great trouble, be considered harmful? It would certainly be an inconsiderate act, yet we should perhaps be disinclined to go as far as decreeing it harmful. A man committing suicide might be considered sovereign over his body and mind (ibid., p. 6) and therefore well within his liberty. Even if this would assuredly be inconvenient and distressful to someone, we have already established that distress in itself is not sufficient to curtail individual liberty.

However, if we concede the point that an inconsiderate act of inconvenience to others does not necessarily qualify as harm. What then is our justification for legislating against theft  – provided the thief is careful enough to merely steal to the point of inconvenience, never crossing into the realm of harm?

An answer to this challenge might be found in Mill’s assertion that:

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it (ibid., p. 8).

Theft on a small enough scale might fall short of depriving an owner of his liberty to pursue own ends. Nevertheless, theft of any kind, no matter the scale, must at least be considered an impediment of the proprietor’s efforts to obtain the commodity in question. This then might seem as relinquishing the claim that the prevention of harm and protection thereof is the sole justification for the exertion of power over a person against their will.

I would contend, though, that this is an underestimate of how far the applicability of the concept ‘harm’ extends. Harm might not only be interpreted as the act of damaging a person’s mind or body. Rather in this context ‘harm’ is properly understood as the act of damaging a person’s pursuit of his own good – by deprivation and impediment alike.

However, I should now argue against Mill in that this newly gained understanding will also have relevance to our previous consideration of inconvenience. Any individual is, by all means, the sovereign of his own mind and body – yet within the constriction of responsibility for not letting either become an impediment to others by sheer selfish recklessness. In other words, even within the liberty to do as one pleases one would still be obliged to a modicum of self-preservation – if not merely for one’s own sake then that of others. This, I would claim, is entirely consistent with the Principle of Liberty and as such might also serve as an incomplete response to a communitarian objection of liberalism’s devaluation of community (Bell, 2008).

An issue raised in An Introduction to Political Philosophy by Jonathan Wolff is that of public indecency (Wolff, 2006, pp. 126-127). Wolff argues that there is an apparent incongruity between Mill’s condemnation of public indecency (Mill, 1865, p. 58) and his Liberty Principle. Wolff argues by the example that sexual intercourse between husband and wife would be in no way condemnable if performed in privacy, yet deemed unacceptable in public. Should Mill not bite the bullet since, by his own insistence, offence is not enough to invoke the principle of harm?

This ties in with our previous consideration that distress alone does not sufficiently justify the censorship of free expression – even if that expression is coitus on a sidewalk. Consistency then demands that we must either allow such indecency, ban freedom of speech alongside it, or somehow make the case that even public indecency is an impediment to the general freedom.

At this point it is helpful to consider the distinction between positive and negative liberty (Carter, 2008). Since all must share the public sphere, the appropriateness of any action must be weighed on the scale of the freedom to do the deed versus that of others from being exposed to it.

An ongoing controversy is that of the Westboro Baptist Church protesting at funerals against homosexuality (Booth, 2007). By our previously established principles their freedom to do so is only an entitlement up to the point where it impedes the bereaved in their freedom from being exposed to such insensitivity at a time of grievance. The example of public coitus might seem trivial in comparison but the same principles apply. Speaking your mind on the radio is freedom of speech because anyone is free to turn it off. Incessantly speaking your mind while tailing someone around against her will is harassment.

In conclusion, I agree that mankind’s sole justification for interference with liberty is self-protection of members from harm. Inasmuch as ‘harm’ is understood in the broad sense of deprivation and impediment of freedom – even to a degree where others become intrinsically involved in the individual’s well-being. I dissent from Mill in willingness to consider individuals entirely as islands, yet I believe my position adheres to the Liberty Principle with the added benefit of greater consistency against prevailing criticism.

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main (Donne, 1959, p. 108).

Bibliography

Books:

Donne, John, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions: Together with Death’s Duel (University of Michigan Press, 1959)

Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, (Longman, Green et. al., 1865)

Wolff, Jonathan, An Introduction to Political Philosophy, revised ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Websites:

Bell, Daniel, “Communitarianism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/communitarianism/>.

Booth, Jenny and agencies, “US anti-gay church that demonstrates at military funerals fined $10.9m”, Times Online (November 1, 2007) URL = <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article2783974.ece/>

Carter, Ian, “Positive and Negative Liberty”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/liberty-positive-negative/>.

Reincarnated as Lunch

I saw a picture of a bird eating a fish over at photo.net.

Oh, no! Dont eat me! No!

Oh, no! Don't eat me! No!

It was bothering me for an eternity. Where had I seen that stupid fish before?

I am not at all delicious! Really!

It looks so strangely familiar. Where could it be?

Leave Britney alone!!!

Leave Britney alone!!!

Oh, yes. That is right. Now I remember.

A Watch-Coloured Sky

In crossing a beach, suppose I pitched my foot against a watch, and were asked how it came to be there. I might possibly answer, that it had lain there since the beginning of time when God created it and placed it there.

But suppose I had found a grain of sand upon the beach, and it should be inquired how the grain happened to be in that place. I should hardly concede the same legitimacy to this question as to the one I had been previously asked – that this particular grain of sand somehow stood out in contrast with its peers in demand of a special explanation for its whereabouts. After all, it is all good and proper to lend oneself to the ponderance of anomalies, but an anomaly repeated a billion times over quickly becomes an expected regularity with no means to cause undue perplexity. I should therefore rightly think the question daft.

Yet why should not this objection serve for the grain of sand as well as for the watch? For this reason, that, when we come to inspect the grain of sand, we find that – unlike the watch – it has no parts put together for a purpose. We do not think that the grain attests to a creator in the same way as the watch. We presume not that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, a vast range of artificers with little grain-shops wherein they toil to assemble the best quality sand-grains for capital gain, and who designed the grain’s beachy function.

If indeed it is so, that for every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, the same might be said to exist in nature. What then – which unearthly and inexplicable lapse in judgement – would ever compel you to pick up the watch in contemplation of its anomalous placement instead of doing the exact same to every single grain of sand in the immediate vicinity?

Were there indeed an artificer of natural phenomena an accurate depiction of the situation would not be that of walking on a beach of grains containing a single watch. Rather it could be likened to walking on a heap of tiny little watches with cawing watches flying around in the watch-coloured sky occasionally to swoop down into the waves of liquid watches to catch a swimming watch to eat. In the distance you might hear the joyful laughter of playing watches and the sound of their warden-watch telling them that there is watch for dinner and they should come into the watch to sit down at the watch to eat. Remember to wash your watches before you dig in!

In a world of magic watch-making governed in its entirety by the whims of a magical watch-maker, and where nothing exists that is not a watch, why would you ever ponder the explanation of anything? It should be no more surprising to find an intricately designed laptop at the surface of one of Jupiter’s moons than it is to find a drop of water in the ocean. A living and breathing dragon or a fairy in your cup-board should hold no greater degree of strangeness to you than a lion or a zebra in Africa.

By all means the universe should be entirely devoid of wonder because anything, no matter how bizarre, could pop into existence by decree of the watch-maker at any moment. Nothing ought to merit any sort of explanatory research because a world run on say-so should have no need of causal contingency. A lamp need not be shining because it is hooked up to an electrical outlet. It might just be obeying orders. A perceived sound does not necessarily stem from anything causing it. It might as well have just spontaneously formed in your inner ear because the watch-maker designed it so.

Why did you pick up the watch? There is nothing to distinguish it from anything else. There is nothing special about a watch among a world of watches, right?

Beam Me Up, Jack Me In

What are the important differences between technological determinism and (technological) instrumentalism? Does either of these theories provide a convincing account of the role of technology in the modern world?
Picture completely unrelated, yet strangely enthralling. Provided courtesy of A Tribe Called Möw

Image utterly unrelated, yet strangely enthralling. Courtesy of A Tribe Called Möw.

Intention

The intention of this essay is to offer a contemplative description of each theory, whereafter an analytical comparison can be made in assessment of the advantages and disadvantages each contributes to the understanding of technology in the modern world. At last I shall posit my own personal suggestion as to how a synthesis of the advantages offered by both could be made.

What is technological instrumentalism?

Optimists hold that technology and its products are value neutral; technologies are passive tools which can be used for good or evil. If technology is sometimes used improperly and causes harm, the fault lies with its human operators and developers, not with the technology. As the proverb goes, ‘It is a poor carpenter who blames his tools’ (Tiles and Oberdiek, 1995, p.12).

Technological instrumentalism is the view that technological artefacts – and even technology itself – are value-neutral. That is they hold no intrinsic political function inherent in their mere existence. As such technology takes on the role of being an extension of human will, which enables human beings to choose using it for better and for worse. Thereby it becomes compellingly tempting to view technology in terms of enhancing human potency.

The perspective is that of utility and empowerment perhaps even with an underlying dream of mankind ultimately conquering the brutality of nature by mastering its secrets. An example might be the invention of a tool like the scythe, providing the empowerment for faster and more efficient harvest for the betterment of the whole community. However, the view also bears with it a heavy burden; namely that of responsibility. The utility of the scythe, for instance, lies solely in the intentionality of the wielder, who at leisure might use it as a tool for producing food for the greater good or as a weapon for great harm.

However, such sinister prospects are commonly brushed aside by the fact that, in general, most people believe in the goodness of human nature. Therefore, even though it is not a necessity, technological instrumentalism is most often coupled with the stance of optimism – as evidenced by Tiles & Oberdiek in the previously mentioned quote.

Seen in this light technological progress will be something to strive for with the prospect of perhaps some day creating the perfect future. A technological utopia where all of man’s mundane basic needs are met as a matter of triviality, thus freeing him to pursue the finer virtues of life. A classical example in popular culture would be the vision of future society as seen in the TV-series Star Trek (Rodenberry, 1966 – )

What is technological determinism?

What we have seen is that the development of ever more powerful technologies does entail great risks that this technology may be put to destructive use. […] It is for this reason that pessimistic critics of technology talk about technological systems and technical practices (techniques) rather than about devices. They see these systems as embodying values beyond those which are evident in selection of the ends intended to be achieved by technological means. The instrumental criterion ‘efficiency’ masks the presence of those values. If efficiency is a measure of the ratio of costs to benefits, how costs and benefits are counted becomes crucial; costs to whom, benefits to whom and of what type? (Loc. Cit., p. 21)

It is difficult to characterise the determinist view without simultaneously contrasting it with that of the instrumentalist. It can be argued that instrumentalism naturally precedes determinism in that thinking of technology as determined to an outcome beyond human control emerges from the ever-increasing complexity and systemisation of technological products and the abstruseness of their infrastructure. After all, a hunter-gatherer, who just created a flint-axe is not likely to think that it controls him.

The determinist view is not necessarily that any singular artefact holds any intrinsic political value – although a strong case could be made for the personal computer or the cellular phone – but that with technological artefacts and the framework of interaction between them becoming steadily the backdrop of our daily lives, human beings themselves have become part of technology. Cogs in the machinery as it were.

Pessimists […] tend to treat technological systems as part of the reality within which people live and work; indeed technological systems constitute this environment by functioning to create and sustain it (Loc. cit.).

The classical examples are that of office and factory workers having no choice but to work in accordance with the standards set by their respective machines and the technological environment (Ibid, p. 22). However, to return to the example of the scythe one might easily imagine a scenario wherein it was decided to pour resources into the improvement and production of scythes for increased efficiency and benefit. Yet, a crucial question raised by determinism would be whose benefit we are speaking of – efficiency to what ends? Advancement in the quality and quantity of scythes is not likely to be of any significant benefit to a carpenter. Therefore, even what initially seemed like such an obviously instrumentalist unit could – if seen in a broader context – easily become a deterministic, politically value-laden privilege of one group over another.

The perspective is the consequences of implementing a specific technology into the context of which environmental systems already exist. Therefore – again without it having to always be the case – technological determinism is commonly coupled with pessimism. Not because human beings are necessarily incompetent or prone to use technology for harm, but because they themselves are part of the big technological machinery, which mercilessly grinds its own capricious course into the unforeseeable future.

Seen in this light technological progress will be something to be critical, wary, and extremely cautious of at the risk of inadvertently making a wrong turn into a dead-end alley with no means of turning back from a future in technological bondage. A technological dystopia, where mankind has become enslaved in a spider-web of his own devices. A classical example in popular culture would be the vision of future society as seen in the film The Matrix (Wachowski, 1999).

Important Differences

Since the superficial differences of the two theories should be fairly self-evident by their descriptive features alone, I shall rather focus on an analytical comparison of what I propose would be the advantages and disadvantages in understanding the nature of technology through the lenses of each perspective.

Instrumentalism, unlike determinism, places the responsibility of technological advancements and its consequences squarely in the lap of humanity. However, it does so at the possible risk of ignoring the profound far-reaching and unforeseeable implications technological changes might impart upon our social norms. The advantage is personal accountability and responsibility, the incentive to initiate improvement, and an aversion towards stagnation.

Determinism, unlike instrumentalism, raises awareness to potential dangers and unintentionally malign complications that uncritical acceptance of new technologies could cause. However, it does so at the cost of individual autonomy and at the risk of stunting an experimental approach to the introduction of new technologies, which might have yielded unpredicted benign results. The advantage is critical thinking, a greater understanding of the holistic whole, and an aversion towards naivety.

Since both approaches have both advantages and disadvantages, instead of opting for a single one, I propose a synthesis.

Conclusion

Why must the choice be between optimistic instrumentalism or pessimistic determinism? Why could it not be symbiotic realism? We should not adopt changes uncritically but neither should we halt change entirely and indefinitely. We should not think of technology as a mere tool but neither should we think of it as a leash. Holism and reductionism are different perspectives of looking at the same subject and neither approach provides a complete understanding in itself.

It is my contention that we ought to think of the relationship between mankind and technology as a symbiosis and make use of instrumentalism and determinism in accordance with their realistic applicability in any given circumstance.

I think Isaac Asimov sums this kind of relationship between continued progress and reflected decision-making thereof beautifully in the following passage:

It is change, continuing change inevitable change, that is the dominant factor in society today. No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not only the world as it is, but the word as it will be – and naturally this means that there must be an accurate perception of the world as it will be. This, in turn, means that our statesmen, our businessmen, our Everyman, must take on a science fictional way of thinking, whether he likes it or not or even whether he knows it or not. Only so can the deadly problems of today be solved (1999).

It is my contention that a sensible understanding of technology in the modern world requires that we think of human beings controlling technology and technology controlling humans in turn as being equally true.

There’s a misconception that a movement in any direction is progression (Germaine Williams, 1995).

Acknowledgements

My girlfriend, Ása Johannesen, deserves thanks for providing helpful comments.

Bibliography

Course handout:

LECTURE 3: Conflicting visions of technology

Books:

Tiles, Mary and Oberdiek, Hans, ‘Conflicting visions of technology,’ in Living in a Technological Culture. Human Tools and Human Values (Routledge, 1995, pp. 12-31) COURSEPACK

Asimov, Isaac, ‘My Own View,’ in The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction, Holdstock, ed., (London: Octopus Books, 1978, p. 5)

Films:

Wachowski, Larry and Wachowski, Andy, The Matrix (Hollywood: Warner Bros., 1999)

TV-series:

Rodenberry, Gene, Star Trek (USA: 1966 – )

Musical albums:

Williams, Germaine, ‘Poet Laureate II,’ track no. 11 on Rip The Jacker, (New York: Babygrand Records, 1995)

Valsendings-Kjaftarí!


Mp3 av hesum sanginum er at finna her.

Go get Adobe Flash Player!


(Sangurin hjá Kristianni byrjar at spæla)
Kristian? Hvat feilar? Hvat er rólogt?
(Veeeeeeeeeeee-)
Kristian?
(-eeeeeee-)
YO!
Sketch: Hvat Fanin?!
(ljóð av plátu ið verður tikin av ógvusliga)
Gulli: Heini, slappa av.
(ljóð av onkrum sum brotnar)
Gulli: Ikki bróta alt ísundur fyri tað.
Vend!
Sketch: For Helviti gev mær eina mikrofon!
Gulli: Tað er í ordan, men so skalt tú eisini slappa av.
Vend!(x9)


Vend! Tað burdi veri forboðið at rappa á val
Vend! Um Kristian bara hevði sagt tað væl
Vend! “Her må henda okkurt!” Halt kjaft tít græl
í hasi forbrendu nevndini og “Vend!” so vendini

Vend! Tað burdi veri forboðið at rappa á val
Vend! Um Kristian bara hevði sagt tað val
Vend! Men hansara lagna skal batna og hann tagna um vit ikki lyriskt
kappa skallan av! (Gulli: Heini góði slappa av…)


nú upp til valið sær man mangt og hvat helviti
er hettar eg hoyri á alnótini her á telduni??
Kristian Magnussen fortelur mær at vendur skal í?
eg vildi heldur havt frí frá valsendings-kjaftarí
óhóskandi propaganda sum blívur øst á okkar’ land tá
Javnaðarflokkurin vil hava atkvøður østar millum manna
køstar sum ikki vita hvørjum beini teir skulu stand’ á
komi nú tit! Royni nú at rappa!
lat meg síggja tykkum kopiera Kára Kool aftur!
tit eru meir splittaðir enn ein og hvør mulattur
so tað er klárt at tit mugu brúka bílig knep
at fáa fólk at atkvøða Javnaðarflokkurin er jú staðstøða
tað næsta verður væl at tit fara AT kvøða
eg læs um tykkum Hvat er hetta fyri fjandans virði?
tit vita ikki eingongd hvat ólukkan tit sjálvi standa fyri
X við lista K lat okkum nú standa handan Kollafirðin!


Niðurlag


og by the way nú eg allíkavæl eri í gongd
valið er av Jóhan er vekk og tann føroyska verðin er flongd
og mín pera er strongd av at royna at skilja
hví politikarar halda seg gera okkum ein beina at dylja
informatiónir teir goyma við vilja meðan teir brúka seg
og Óli vil revsa sjónvarpið fyri at avdúka her?
velja hann? Hví ikki bara fáa Sadam flognan inn nú og her?
tí tað er hvat eitt slit av slíkum súðum er
eitt reint diktatur tit eru forútsigiligir sum eitt slitfast ur
á tinginum? Teir hava ikki landsoperatións-hilling har
álop á muslimar og diskriminatións-gyklingar
Miðflokkurin, tit eru bara religiónsvillingar!
og Kristian eg tosaði við teg og við hasi timingini hevur tú rætt
men eg vil skíta á um hetta verður stórt so leingi tað er sagt
so nú veist tú hvar mítt X fer og góði vend
yo eg og Equinox eru Tjóðveldismenn…


Niðurlag


hehe ok…
Og forrestin; hvis man fær ov nógvar C-vitaminir blívur man fullur av piss mann…
Tað forklárar alt nokkso flott, ha? Hehe eg vildi gjarna sæð Kristian
givið mær ein frammaná ella ein uppercut haha

Vend!

Open Brain-Surgery

May I have your attention please, dear readers and/or readettes! This just came in from the cold, cold North, which I like to call ‘home.’

Faroese politicians Torbjørn Jacobsen, Páll á Reynatúgvu, Bill Justinussen, and Jenis av Rana have placed before Faroese parliament, The Law Thing, a proposal, that the age of voting be reduced from 18 to 16. The education, they say, is so good in today’s society that young people become adults faster and therefore susceptibility is no valid counter-argument. This is backed up by recent Programme for International Student Assessment survey issued in 2006 where the only country scoring lower than the Faroes was Mexico out of 35 countries participating. (…)

Torbjørn Jacobsen and Páll á Reynatúgvu are members of The Republican Party, which would like to see a Faroe Islands free from Denmark and governed by the Faroese people.

Bill Justinussen and Jenis av Rana are respectively a member and the chairman of The Centre Party, which would like to see a Faroe Islands free from reason and governed by a vengeful metaphysical entity obeying their every whim and prejudice.

Jenis av Rana, who recently published an open letter about the lack of tolerance for Christians and the suffering they have to endure because of prejudiced atheists, is best known for consequently referring to homosexuals as Satan’s Ill Weeds and ‘sex-confused’, a term that has become an epithet in the Faroese language equalling that of calling black persons the N-word. (How dare the people we are prejudiced against prejudice against us!) Other notable achievements of The Centre Party include, but are not limited to, failing to ban The Vagina Monologues because of obscenity, failing to ban stores from being open on Sundays because it’s sacred, and trying to keep homosexuals from gaining basic human rights. (Why is Amnesty so prejudiced and intolerant to our faith?!)

Additional laws proposed by The Centre Party include, that the legal drinking age be increased to 21, that bars, pubs and similar be prohibited from selling alcohol before seven pm and that Rúsan – the only store allowed to carry hard liquor – be prohibited from being open for business before noon.

In other words because of non-existent adolescent public awareness young people today become rational and responsible so fast – just take Jenis & Bill as an indication – that they are mature enough to decide what is best for Society at large at age sixteen, but not mature enough to decide what is best for their own body before aged twenty-one and will never be mature enough to be trusted to decide for themselves which plays their sinful psyches can bear to watch. Thank goodness for The Centre Party safely leading The Faroes out of moral decline!

Since Jenis av Rana is a general physician, I’d like to propose a law that allows him to perform open brain-surgery but prohibits him from prescribing cough syrup. Because that is how it is done in The Centre Party, where we prepare for the second coming by alienating ourselves from the first.

Thanks guys, you put the ‘fun’ in fundamentalist.

Ceterum Censeo Centre Partynem Esse Delendam.

Source: portal.fo